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University-industry relationships (UIRs) have emerged as key forces in the 
development and commercialization of agricultural biotechnology.  During the past two 
decades, changes in patent law and federal policy, new commercial opportunities, and the 
relative decline of public research funding have altered and strengthened the collaborative 
research relationships between university and industry.  There are a number of indications that 
UIRs have strengthened over the past few decades.  For example, by 1990, approximately 
1,056 university-industry R&D centers had been established in the United States, almost 60% 
of them during the 1980s (Cohen et al. 1998).  Industry-funded university research increased 
from $630 million in 1985 to 1.896 billion in 1998 (NSB 2000), and a recent survey of U.S. 
science faculty revealed that many of them want even closer partnerships with industry 
(Morgan 1998).  
These relationships are crucial for research financing, for the transfer of new 
knowledge from laboratory to marketplace, and for graduate education.  Yet the university’s 
dependence on private-sector support may be affecting its research agenda.  In particular, 
research with few immediate commercial applications, such as projects impinging on the 
environmental impacts of new plant varieties, might be increasingly neglected. 
Literature Review 
The recent growth in private support for academic research has resulted in a rich 
literature on the forces, formation, and trends of university-industry collaboration, on the   2 
prevalence of UIRs, on industry/university motivations in establishing this collaboration, and 
on the debate about the potential benefits and risks of such alliances. 
Santoro and Alok (1999) review the importance of university-industry relationships 
and contend that a good fit exists between industry’s needs and current university missions.  
Access to complementary research activity and research results, and to the human capital at 
universities, are the two broad motivations private firms have for engaging in a university-
industry relationships.  Cohen et al. (1998) provide a selective review of literature, which in 
general emphasizes that university research enhances firms’ sales, R&D productivity, and 
patenting activity.  As contrasted with providing a substitute for it, Hall (2000) claims that 
UIRs stimulate and enhance the power of R&D conducted in industry. 
Huffman (2001) looks at public- and private-sector linkages and their importance in 
creating value from agricultural research and development.  He points out that discoveries 
from basic research are primarily global public goods, while those embodied in products or 
processes are patentable and are either private or impure public goods. 
Other analysts have sought to identify and measure the links between academic 
research and industrial innovation.  Mansfield, for example, finds that 11% of the new 
products and 9% of the new processes introduced by surveyed industries could not have been 
developed in the absence of the academic research carried out during the 15 years preceding 
the commercialization. 
Blumenthal and colleagues have administered survey and case studies on the 
prevalence, magnitude, commercial benefits, and potential risks of UIRs.  Nearly one-half of 
surveyed biotechnology companies fund research in universities.  And over 60 percent of 
companies providing support for life-science research in universities had received patents,   3 
products, or sales as a result of those relationships (Blumenthal et al. 1986a).  Per dollar 
invested, university research has produced more than four times as many patent applications 
as has commercial research.  Two separate surveys of universities (Blumenthal 1986b, 
Blumenthal et al. 1996) indicate that researchers with industrial support publish at higher 
rates, patent more frequently, participate in more administrative and professional activities, 
and earn more than do colleagues without such support.  But no statistically significant 
differences were found in teaching time.   
In a related study, Lee (2000) finds an overwhelming majority of faculty members, 
94%, and industry technology managers, 91%, think they are likely to expand or at least 
maintain the present level of collaboration with one another. 
Other work has concentrated on the rising citation linkage between U.S. patents and 
scientific research papers.  By tracing the rapidly growing references of U.S. patents to 
scientific papers, Narin and his colleagues (1997) find that 73% of the papers cited in U.S. 
industry patents are to public science, authored at academic, governmental, and other public 
institutions.  Only 27% are authored by industrial scientists. 
Zucker and Darby (2002) focus on the use of basic science knowledge in commercial 
firms and on the impact of that knowledge on firm performance.  They identify 327 “star” 
bio-scientists, based upon genetic-sequence discoveries reported in GenBank.  Co-publishing 
between academic and firm scientists is used as a detector of joint research and university-
industry technology transfer.  Their results confirm academic science’s strong effects on firm 
success. 
However, most studies on UIRs have been descriptive.  Little econometric modeling 
has been devoted to them, and the econometric studies available specialize on very specific   4 
aspects of the innovation and technology transfer system.  No tests have been undertaken on 
the manner in which UIRs affect the scientist’s research agenda, and in particular on how they 
affect the provision of public goods in agricultural biotechnology.  New theory and data are 
needed for these purposes. 
Objective 
The central objective of the present paper is to examine how university bioscientists 
select their research agendas, with special attention to biotechnology firms’ influence on those 
agendas.  Among other issues, we will assess UIRs’ potential effects on the private 
appropriability of the characteristics of bioengineered crop and animal varieties, and on the 
basicness and breadth of a scientist’s research.  Factors that potentially would affect 
scientists’ research agenda include the university’s size, reputation, resources, culture, and 
total government funding; the scientist’s academic position and communication network; and 
the market power, cultures, and specialties of the biotech firms with which the university has 
research relationships.  An electronic survey of academic life scientists, concentrating on their 
research objectives, funding sources, collaborators, contracts, and budgets, will form much of 
the data for testing these models. 
Conceptual Analysis 
As a conceptual basis for implementing such a study, suppose a university life 
scientist pursues a number of research projects, each with its own set of objectives.  In a given 
time period, let’s define the following variables: 
S          the vector of the scientist’s research objectives;   5 
Pub         the quantity and quality of the scientist’s research publications;  
G            the scientist’s total grant funding; 
Cuniv       characteristics of the scientist’s university (e.g., university size, reputation, 
resources, culture, and government funding, and university policy regarding 
scientists’ equity shares in patent revenues or start-up firms);   
Cscientist   the scientist’s demographic variables and attitudes (e.g. academic position, years in 
profession, and communication network);  
Cfirm       characteristics of the biotechnology firms with which the university has a research 
relationship (e.g., the market power, research cultures, and specialties of these 
firms);  
Cpolicy     relevant government policies (e.g. the legislature’s current preference for basic 
versus applied research, and availability of state formula funding). 
The scientist reasonably would make choices among alternative research objectives in 
such a way as to maximize her utility U, taking into consideration the influence the objectives 
have on the amount of funding to which she will have access.  The optimization problem, 
then, is to choose S to 
 
(1)                     Max  U  =  U [Pub (G, S),  G,  Cuniv, Cscientist, Cfirm, Cpolicy ]                                                
(2)                           s.t.    G  =  G (S , Cuniv , Cscientist , Cfirm , Cpolicy).             
We assume in equations (1) and (2) that the bioscientist’s utility is a direct function of 
her publication quantity and quality, total grant funds, and exogenous variables Cuniv, Cscientist, 
Cfirm , and Cpolicy .  Publication quality and quantity in turn are a function of the scientist’s   6 
total grant funding and research objectives.  In this way, the scientist’s choices among 
alternative research objectives, and total grant funding, each affect her utility both directly and 
indirectly.   
In particular observe that, by way of equation (2), G is a function of the bioscientist’s 
research objectives S and of all exogenous variables.  Grant funding is, in contrast to a 
scientist choice variable, determined by the agencies which fund research.  These agencies 
are, in their own turn, influenced by the scientist’s research objectives and human capital, the 
characteristics of the university at which the scientist works, and the characteristics of the 
firm(s) providing research resources. 
Solving this optimization problem gives the reduced form 
(3)                S    =    f (Cuniv , Cscientist , Cfirm , Cpolicy ).         
The relationship between a bioscientist’s research behavior and the factors potentially 
influencing it can be characterized in this reduced form.  Equation (3) says that the scientist’s 
research objectives are a function of the characteristics of the university, scientist, and firm, 
including the scientist’s demographic variables and attitudes, the scientist’s geographic 
location, and university and government policies.   
Empirical Analysis 
In the present study, we will express bioscience research objectives in four 
dimensions.  A scientist will select her research objectives (S) according to: (a) alternative 
crop, plant, and animal categories; (b) alternative research specialties such as genetics and 
biomolecular structure; (c) basic versus applied research; and (d) public versus private   7 
research, i.e. projects whose benefits are nonrival and nonexcludable versus those which are 
privately appropriable. 
To reflect crop, plant, and animal categories, we ask the scientist to indicate the 
primary organism with which she is working, the alternatives being:  major crop/animal, 
minor crop/animal, and model (e.g., arabidopsis, microorganisms).  We are interested in the 
organism of ultimate interest rather than the organism with which the scientist happens to be 
working as a tool.  Therefore, we let 
S
a :      be the vector of the bioscientist’s crop, plant, and animal category alternatives, where 
S
a = || Si 
a ||,  i = 1, 2, 3.  Si 
a = 1 if alternative i is chosen, Si 
a = 0 otherwise. 
In terms of research specialty, we characterize the bioscientist’s research specialties in 
the following six categories:  agronomic/production properties (including herbicide 
tolerance), developmental mechanisms, environmental response mechanisms, pest/disease 
resistance, risk assessment, and product quality.  Therefore, we let  
S
b :      be the vector of the bioscientist’s research specialty alternatives, where S
b = || Sj 
b ||,  
j = 1, …, 6.  Sj 
b = 1 if alternative j is chosen, Sj 
b = 0 otherwise. 
Directly measuring or distinguishing between “basic” and “applied,” or “public” and 
“private,” either in the scientist’s research specialties or in the crop/animal types she studies, 
is not easy.  Smaller crops tend to be more public in the sense that the researcher can’t gain 
much profit from working on them.  The more basic research tends to be more public because 
it has numerous applications, many of which are nonrival and nonexludable.  However, some 
basic research projects target particular major crop types, for example when the research is   8 
directed toward plasmid vectors or promoters considered most useful in the bioengineering of 
those crops. 
In order to accurately and extensively examine such issues, we might wish the 
scientists themselves to indicate the degree of basicness and publicness of the research they 
are conducting.  In our survey, we ask the scientist to estimate the basicness or publicness of 
their research by revealing “basic versus applied” and “public versus private” on a five-point 
Likert scale.  The scale runs from unity for ‘purely basic’ or ‘purely public’ research to five 
for ‘purely applied’ or ‘purely private’ research.  By combining the scientist’s own view of 
the basicness and publicness of her research on the one hand with her research specialties and 
targeted crop, plant, and animal type on the other, we can obtain a better view of her research 
orientation.  Let 
S
c :      be the vector indicating the basicness of the bioscientist’s research program, where    
S
c = || Sm 
c ||,  m = 1, …, 5.  Sm 
c = 1 if alternative m is chosen, Sm 
c = 0 otherwise.  
S
d :      be the vector indicating the publicness of the bioscientist’s research program, where  
S
d  = || Sn 
d ||,  n = 1, …, 5.  Sn 
d = 1 if alternative n is chosen, Sn 
d = 0 otherwise. 
Exogenous vectors Cscientist , Cuniv , Cfirm , and Cpolicy in the reduced-form conceptual 
framework of equation (3) can be defined more specifically as follows.  Let  
Year       be the scientist’s experience in years;   
ap           be the scientist’s academic position (e.g. assistant, associate, or full professor); 
lg            be the variable indicating the “culture” of the scientist’s university:  lg = 1 if it is 
Land Grant, lg = 0 otherwise; 
tg            be total government funding of the scientist’s university;   9 
￿             be any royalty rate the scientist obtains from her patent licenses, indicating the 
university’s licensing policy; 
sf            be the scientist’s state or formula funding; 
loc          be the geographic location of any biotechnology firm with which the scientist may 
be working, where loc = 1 if the biotechnology firm is located near the scientist’s 
university and loc = 0 otherwise; 
size         be the size of any biotechnology firms with which the scientist may have a research 
relationship. 
An econometrically estimable version of equation (3) can now be specified as 
(1’)                S
a    =    f (year, ap, lg, tg, ￿, sf, loc, size)                                                    
(2’)                S
b    =    g (year, ap, lg, tg, ￿, sf, loc, size)                                                        
(3’)                S
c    =    h (year, ap, lg, tg, ￿, sf, loc, size)                                                        
(4’)                S
d    =    i (year, ap, lg, tg, ￿, sf, loc, size)                     
As is evident, all the dependent variables in this model are discrete.  A probit model is 
therefore appropriate.  The probit model estimates the probability of choosing research project 
alternative i, j, m, and n given the characteristics of the scientist, university, and 
biotechnology firm, which do not vary across alternatives. 
To illustrate, consider the scientist’s decision regarding the basicness of her research 
projects.  Let the expected utility of choosing basicness alternative m be 
(5’)                    Um
c   =   U 
c ( year, ap, lg, tg, ￿, sf, loc, size)  +  em        m  =  1, …, 5.   10 
Residual em represents unobserved factors which influence expected utility.  The scientist’s 
decision is to choose the basicness alternative giving the highest expected utility.  That is, the 
individual chooses alternative m if       
(6’)                   U m
c 
 > U l 
c                      "   m ¹  l         
The probability the scientist will choose alternative m is  
(7’)                   P m
c   =   Prob ( S m
c  =  1 )  =  Prob ( U m
c 
 > U l 
c )          "   m ¹  l ,        
as conditioned by the exogenous variables.   
We expect to estimate jointly two ordered probit models of basicness and publicness, 
and two multinomial models of the choice of research specialty and of major versus minor 
crop/animal type.  It is reasonable to allow correlations among the errors of the four probit 
models because the scientist selects among her four-dimensional research objectives 
simultaneously.  
Hypotheses 
Model (1’) – (4’) can be used to test hypotheses about the principal factors affecting 
the scientist’s research behavior.  
·  Scientists with lower academic rank, e.g. assistant professor, tend to conduct more 
basic research than do those with higher rank.  Our reasoning is that newer professors 
have stronger theoretical skills and a greater incentive to distinguish themselves as 
competent basic scientists.   11 
·  Bioscientists at Land Grant universities tend to choose more applied research 
programs than do those at non-Land-Grant universities, given the nature of the Land 
Grant university mission. 
·  As patent license royalty rates (￿) increase, scientists choose more privately funded 
research projects and hence are more likely to provide private rather than public 
goods. 
·  Bioscientists with higher proportions of private-sector funding are more likely to 
conduct research on problems with an applied focus, given the profit-making 
incentives of private firms. 
·  Bioscientists at universities attracting greater government funding tend to work on 
more public (less rival and excludable) characteristics of crop and animal varieties. 
Other than test the above hypotheses, we can use our model to determine whether 
scientists from larger (smaller) universities collaborate more with larger (start-up) firms; 
whether there are differences between Land Grant, non-Land-Grant, and private universities 
in UIRs participation; and which subfields of agricultural biotechnology are more likely to be 
involved in UIRs.  
Our model focuses on the scientist’s intentions and behavior, not on her research 
results such as publication or patenting successes.  Nor does it permit us to explain university 
or government policies themselves.  Nevertheless, we may use our findings to assess 
alternative policy options for influencing the supply of public goods in agricultural 
biotechnology research.  Alternative policy options include:  (i) increasing total government 
funding, (ii) shifting government funding toward basic research, (iii) concentrating   12 
government funding on more or less productive universities, and (iv) steering government 
support toward or away from universities with extensive industry contacts. 
Survey Design and Sample Selection 
Survey 
As mentioned earlier, an electronic survey of academic bioscientists, concentrating on 
their research objectives, resources, contracts, and budgets, will enable construction of the 
first laboratory-level economic data base on plant and animal biotechnology.  The survey will 
form much of the data for testing the above models and therefore will provide the means for 
examining the impact on university bioscience agendas of a wide variety of university, 
industry, and public policies. 
Our initial thinking was that project-by-project data would be necessary for an 
analysis of a scientist’s research objectives.  The rationale was that project-level information 
would be essential for obtaining adequate sample variation on the proportions of a scientist' s 
time allocated to alternative objectives (crop, specialty, publicness, and basicness).  However, 
project-level information is possible only to the extent that a scientist’s research technology is 
nonjoint, i.e. that she operates a lab in which projects essentially are kept separate from one 
another.  More likely, the technology is joint:  the scientist' s several "projects" feed into a 
joint research program.  Furthermore, if her projects really are joint, trying to obtain data on 
each of them separately would confuse and frustrate the respondent and hence reduce our 
response rate.  We therefore have decided to ask each scientist to provide responses only for 
her overall research program.  By research program, we mean the portfolio of all of the 
scientist’s current research projects.   13 
Sample Issues  
Our targeted population includes all academic scientists who potentially are working 
in plant and animal biotechnology fields in the United States. 
1.  Sample universities 
We first restrict our university population to “Doctoral/Research Universities – 
Extensive” in the Carnegie Classification.  These institutions typically offer a wide range of 
baccalaureate programs, are committed to graduate education through the doctorate, and 
awarded 50 or more doctoral degrees per year across at least 15 disciplines.  The total number 
of universities in this category is 151, among which 48 are Land Grant (including Cornell 
University), 55 are public non-Land-Grant, and 48 are private non-Land-Grant universities 
(excluding Cornell University).  We then drew twenty universities in each of the three 
following categories:  Land Grant, private non-Land-Grant, and public non-Land-Grant.   
2.  Sample departments 
We next go to each university’s website and record the names of all biologically-
related departments at that university.  Because faculty conducting research related to 
agricultural biotechnology are spread widely across departments, we are asking a panel of 
bioscientists to revise downward the departments we will employ for assembling our sample.  
Our approach for doing so is to ask the panel of experts to sort the departments into one of 
five categories, reflecting the probability they will contain bioscientists we wish to survey.  
The five categories are: (i) 0 percent, (ii) 1 - 25 percent, (iii) 26 - 50 percent, (iv) 51 - 75 
percent, and (v) 76 - 100 percent engaged in research with direct or primary implications for 
plant and animal biotechnologies.  After responses are obtained from our panel, we will   14 
assign an average probability to each department and rank each as a candidate for 
enumeration. 
3.  Sample bioscientists 
Once the relevant departments are selected, we will obtain our list of faculty members 
by drawing their names and email addresses from university websites.  Our survey instrument 
itself will contain further screening questions asking whether the scientist is pursuing research 
that is agricultural or would have agricultural implications. 
The purpose of the above procedures is to obtain an unbiased national random sample 
of academic scientists who potentially are working in plant or animal biotechnology.  This 
national database will, we believe, capture the diversity of university-industry relationships in 
agricultural biotechnology, permitting estimation of equations (1’) – (4’). 
Our goal is to estimate how UIRs affect the breadth of scientific research, the public-
good aspects of university research, and the types of new plant or animal characteristics likely 
to be forthcoming from it.  The results should provide important insights to university, 
industry, and government policymakers in the management of university-industry 
relationships.  They should also provoke broader discussions about UIRs themselves and 
about the rise of agricultural biotechnology.   15 
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